核拡散とは濃縮ウランとプルトニウムのことなので 商用原発で水爆用トリチウムを製造することは核拡散防止条約（NPT）と矛盾しない。ML032460376 98/651ページ(1.3.5 Nonproliferation) ヤバい解釈。あべしや石原ならやりそうだ。
Nuclear proliferation refers to the spread of nuclear weapons to nonnuclear weapons states. In an effort to limit nuclear proliferation, the United States, along with other signatories to the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty, has sought to preclude nonnuclear weapons states from acquiring fissile materials (highly enriched uranium or plutonium) for weapons or explosive use. Under the terms of the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty, the United States is a weapons state and, as such, is allowed to conduct nuclear weapons activities. The production of tritium is one such activity. Accordingly, the use of a CLWR for the production of tritium is not inconsistent with the terms of the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty.
Along with other weapons-state signatories to the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty, the United States, under Article VI, undertakes to pursue negotiations on nuclear disarmament. Production of tritium in a CLWR in no way conflicts with these commitments. Since the end of the Cold War, the United States has significantly reduced the size of its nuclear weapons stockpile. At the present time, the United States is further downsizing the nuclear weapons stockpile consistent with the terms of the Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START) I. The United States has ratified the START II Treaty and is hopeful Russia also will ratify this treaty soon. Additionally, the United States has ceased production of fissile materials and the manufacture of new-design nuclear weapons and has closed several weapons production facilities.
Negotiations required for further reductions in United States nuclear weapons and, ultimately, total nuclear disarmament, likely will stretch well into the next century. United States production of tritium in a CLWR will support the U.S. nuclear weapons stockpile during this process. Such support of a decreased nuclear weapons stockpile is not inconsistent with the long-range goal of total nuclear disarmament.
The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) is charged with detecting and deterring the spread of nuclear weapons. The United States has offered its commercial power plants for inspection by the LAEA as an act of good faith and to encourage other nations to be equally open about their nuclear programs. Commercial reactor tritium production would not change this commitment. The commercial reactors would remain open for IAEA inspection whether they are producing tritium or not. Furthermore, the IAEA has indicated that CLWR production of tritium would not alter the existing IAEA Safeguards Program
In accordance with the direction provided in the Fiscal Year 1998 National Defense Authorization Act (P.L. 105-85) conference report, DOE facilitated a high-level interagency review of the policy issues associated with the use of commercial reactors to make tritium for national security purposes. The participants in the interagency review included the NRC, the U.S. Department of Defense, and the U.S. Department of State Arms Control offices. This process was completed in July 1998 and is documented in the Interagency Review of the Nonproliferation Implications of Alternative Tritium Production Technologies Under Consideration by the Department of Energy, A Report to the Congress (DOE 1998d). The report concluded that the nonproliferation policy issues associated with the use of a CLWR are manageable and that DOE should continue to pursue the reactor option as a viable source for future tritium production. This conclusion was based upon a number of considerations including the following:
1. The use of CLWRs for tritium production is not prohibited by law or international treaty.
2. Historically, there have been numerous exceptions to the practice of differentiating between U.S. civil and military facilities, including the operation of the N-Reactor at Hanford, Washington; the dual-use nature of the U.S. enrichment program; the use of defense program plutonium production reactors to produce radioisotopes for civilian purposes; and the sale of tritium produced in the defense reactors in the U.S. commercial market.
3. Although the CLWR alternative raised initial concerns because of its implications for the policy of maintaining separation between U.S. civil and military nuclear activities, these concerns could be adequately addressed, given the particular circumstances involved. These circumstances include the fact that the reactors would remain eligible for LAEA safeguards and the fact that, if TVA were the utility selected for the tritium mission, the reactors used for tritium production would be owned and operated by the U.S. Government, making them roughly comparable to past instances of government-owned dualpurpose nuclear facilities.
In addition to those examples referred to in the Interagency Review of the Nonproliferation Implications of Alternative Tritium Production Technologies Under Consideration by the Department of Energy, A Report to the Congress (DOE 1998d), there are other instances in which military nuclear programs have been commingled with civilian programs. These instances include: (1) Atomic Energy Commission purchase of plutonium separated from commercial reactor spent fuel for unrestricted use, including defense purposes; (2) fabrication of both military and commercial reactor fuel by commercial reactor fuel fabricators; and (3) TVA generation of electricity for use in the production of fissile military materials.
Bonaponta in 原発 11:39午前 2 12, 2014
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