弁財天

ゴフマン「専門家を信じるのではなく、自分自身で考えて判断せよ」

レーザー濃縮技術(AVLIS) update5


2003年5月15日豪サイレックス社がレーザー濃縮から撤退。 USECは遠心分離器を採用。

安心のレーザー核融合と同じ安心のレーザー濃縮w

レーザーはウラン以外の同位体(プルトニウム)でも使える簡単で安価な技術。
Atomic vapor laser isotope separation
AVLISは2003年に公開。イランも知ってクレームを入れてる。じゃぁ2010年に起きたとされるイランのナタンツの1000台の遠心分離器がStuxnetで破壊された話って本当なの。これも陽動か。

USECはAVLISに1億ドルの投資してたが1999年6月9日にプロジェクトをキャンセル。
2003年の槌田氏のレポートのとおり。
しかし2004年4月30日の記事によるとDOEがAVLISを再開
DOE'S REVIVAL OF PLUTONIUM LASER PURIFICATION PLANT POSES SEVERE PROLIFERATION AND TERRORISM RISKS

WASHINGTON D.C. April 30, 2004 --/WORLD-WIRE/-- The Department of Energy's plan to revive the long-dormant plutonium AVLIS (Atomic Vapor Laser Isotope Separation) Plant at Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory poses severe nuclear proliferation and terrorism risks, the Nuclear Control Institute warned today.

NCI Founding President Paul Leventhal noted the recent discovery of a secret laser enrichment program in Iran and said, "Given the urgency of U.S. efforts to win wide international support for shutting down Iran's nuclear weapons program, this is surely precisely the wrong time to start up a nuclear-weapons AVLIS program at Livermore National Laboratory." Testifying at a hearing examining DOE's pending Environmental Impact Statement for the laboratory, he said: "A major defect of the" EIS is that there is no non-proliferation analysis of the impact of the plutonium AVLIS program."

He recalled two previous rejections by Congress and the White House of attempts by DOE to use laser technology to mine weapons-grade plutonium from so-called reactor-grade plutonium produced by commercial nuclear power plants and fuel-grade plutonium produced by DOE's reactors. In 1982, Congress reacted by enacting the Hart-Simpson-Mitchell Amendment prohibiting use of commercial plutonium or enriched uranium. In 1989, Congress responded to non-proliferation and terrorism concerns expressed by the U.S. National Research Council and a group of experts organized by the Nuclear Control Institute by sharply reducing funding for what was then called the Special Isotope Separation (SIS) plant. The following year the Reagan Administration cancelled the SIS.

"Those arguments are equally applicable today," said Leventhal in submitting the experts' letter and the Council's report to DOE. The experts, who included Gerard Smith, former chief SALT I negotiator and former ambassador-at-large for nuclear non-proliferation, warned that construction and operation of the SIS plant in would threaten U.S. non-proliferation objectives without providing offsetting national-security benefits. They cited "obvious nuclear proliferation and terrorism risks, as well as safeguards and verification problems."

Leventhal criticized DOE for being vague about what plutonium isotopes the plant would produce for the Stockpile Stewardship program, for not looking seriously at alternative means for producing them, and for not ruling out eventual use of the plant for purifying commercial plutonium into weapons grade or the export of laser refinement technology to other countries.

CONTACT: Paul Leventhal 202-822-8444 leventhal@nci.org

CFRのプレゼン資料の10ページw
The actual separation efficiency is classified and so is the repetition rate of the laser pulses as well as the pulse widths.

米のAVLIS/MLISを日本では理研がRIMLIS(RIKEN’s Molecular Laser Isotope Separation)、Laser-Jの名前で研究。 ML12045A051の47/65ページに普通に紹介されてる。NRCの教科書。

Other Countries
Brazil, Iran, South Korea, and a few other countries have tested LIS and produced enriched uranium at a laboratory scale (milligram and, in some cases, gram quantities). Assays have ranged from power reactor LEU to HEU (50% – 70%). As of this time, these programs have not progressed into larger facilities.
ブラジル、イラン、韓国の(ミリグラムかグラム程度の)研究室レベルのレーザ濃縮の実験を紹介。LEUを50%から70%のHEUに濃縮できたとしている。現時点ではプラントが小さい、より大きなプラントにはなってない。50/65ページ。
核爆弾なら94%以上だが原発の燃料なら5%程度。これがレーザ濃縮が平和利用で「さよならマンハッタン計画」とSILEX社が宣伝する理由。

レーザ濃縮と言えば米のU-AVLIS、日本のRIMLIS、豪のSILEX、仏のSILVA。日米仏は出資側なので豪SILEXにはライセンス料を払う。レーザー濃縮も商売。
豪SILEX社は12人の博士号と11人のエンジニアを含むたった40人の会社。SILEX技術はレーザー濃縮のカテゴリではMLISに分類される。原子ならAVLISで分子ならMLISか。

トム・クレメンツ(ML12142A054)の5ページ。商用プラントの600分の1のスケールで核兵器は製造可能。核兵器より核燃料。

While there may be challenges in scaling SILEX technology to commercial scales, we should remember that a weapon-quantity of highly enriched uranium can be produced annually using only 1/600 the capacity of a commercial-scale facility.(9) All that is needed is to know which technical pathway to pursue, and to have the confidence to pursue it-both factors that would be solidified by the commercial development of SILEX.

(9)1SQ (25kg) of 90% HEU requires about 5000 SWU. A typical commercial plant is about 3 million SWU/year.

もっと安く簡単にレーザー濃縮する理研のRIMLISやLaser-Jではなく、無意味に危険で無意味に高純度の「もんじゅ」を推進するというのは陸軍の作戦としても失策。やっぱ自爆テロみたいなのを想定してるのか。日本って神風特攻隊とか回天みたいなのばっかり。こんなんじゃ戦争にも勝てない。


レーザー濃縮は今でこそGE日立(GLE)がUSECの後釜だけどAVLISは昔から企画されてたんだな。


10時間で1%濃縮とか。

投稿されたコメント:

コメント
  • HTML文法 許可